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Abstract  
In this paper, we shed light on the debate about the financial performance of 
socially responsible investment (SRI) mutual funds by separately analyzing the 
contributions of before-fee performance and fees to SRI funds' performance and by 
investigating the role played by fund management companies in the determination of 
those variables. We apply the matching estimator methodology to obtain our results 
and find that in the period 1997-2005, US SRI funds had better before- and after-fee 
performance than conventional funds with similar characteristics. The differences, 
however, are driven exclusively by SRI funds run by management companies 
specialized in SRI. While these funds significantly outperform similar conventional 
funds, funds run by companies not specialized in SRI underperform their matched 
conventional funds. We find no significant differences in fees between SRI and 
conventional funds except in one case: SRI funds are cheaper than conventional funds 
run by the same management company.  
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Whether or not investing in SRI funds carries a price in terms of a reduced financial 
performance is an essential question for those investors who are concerned about the ethical 
consequences of their investments and, at the same time, want to obtain an adequate financial 
return from those investments. Previous research on socially responsible investment (SRI) 
mutual funds has, thus, focused on comparing the financial performance of SRI and 
conventional funds. In this paper, we make four main contributions to the debate on the financial 
performance of SRI funds. First, we make a clear distinction between the two components of 
mutual fund net financial performance: before-fee performance and fees. According to standard 
portfolio choice theory, constraining the investment opportunity set cannot improve 
performance. Since one of the defining characteristics of most SRI funds is that they exclude 
from their investment universe companies from sectors such as tobacco, alcohol, or gambling, it 
follows that their before-fee risk-adjusted performance should be no higher than the one they 
could obtain if they lifted those restrictions. While the implicit assumption in most previous 
work is that differences in performance between SRI and conventional funds, if any, would be 
due to differences in SRI funds' ability to generate risk-adjusted returns, differences in reported 
performance (which is net of fund expenses) could as well be due to differences in fees.1 By 
investigating before-fee performance we can evaluate directly whether SRI funds underperform 
conventional ones, without the potentially confounding effect of fees. Second, explicitly 
analyzing fees allows us to determine whether investors in SRI funds pay an explicit price for 
the ethical value of their investments. Our results also shed light on the way in which mutual 
fund fees are determined, particularly on the question of whether fees simply reflect funds' 
operating costs or, as argued by Christofersen and Musto (2002) and Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú 
(2009), they are set taking into account the performance sensitivity of funds' clienteles. This is 
especially relevant in the context of the recent debate in the literature regarding the sensitivity of 
SRI fund investors to performance (Bollen, 2007; Renneboog et al., 2008a; and Benson and 
Humphrey, 2008).  
Third, we analyze the role of fund management companies in determining the differences 
between SRI and conventional funds. Despite the key influence of mutual fund management 
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companies over fees and performance, their role has not been previously investigated in the 
literature on SRI. This is particularly relevant because estimated differences between SRI and 
conventional funds may not be due to the socially responsible investing per se, but to differences 
between the companies that manage SRI funds and those that manage conventional funds.  
Finally, we improve upon the matched-pair analysis employed in several prior studies by 
using the matching estimator methodology of Abadie and Imbens (2006). This methodology 
provides a systematic procedure to find matches when matching is done on several variables 
simultaneously, as well as a method to adjust for the bias that arises when matches with identical 
values of the matching variables are not available.  
To derive our empirical results, we obtain a sample of equity SRI funds from the Social 
Investment Forum for the period 1997-2005 and merge this sample with the CRSP Survivor 
Bias Free US Mutual Fund Database. Our results indicate that the SRI constraint does not 
reduce funds' before-fee performance, measured using the four-factor alpha of Carhart (1997). 
On the contrary, SRI funds outperform comparable conventional funds by a substantial 0.96% to 
1.83% per year before expenses. We investigate whether differences in before-fee performance 
between SRI and conventional funds are due to differences in fund turnover, which has been 
documented to have a negative effect on fund performance (Carhart, 1997). We find that SRI 
funds exhibit lower turnover, but this cannot explain the performance differential between SRI 
and conventional funds.  
We do not find economically or statistically significant differences in fees (expenses, 
loads, or a measure of the total ownership cost of mutual fund shares) between SRI and similar 
conventional funds. Therefore, either there are no significant differences in the way fees are set 
for SRI and conventional funds, or the effects of those differences cancel out on average.  
Consistent with the results for before-fee performance and fees, we find that SRI funds 
obtain a higher after-fee risk-adjusted performance in terms of four-factor alpha than similar 
conventional funds.  
To evaluate the robustness of our results, we repeat the tests separately for the 1997-2001 
and 2002-2005 subperiods and find that SRI funds outperform conventional funds in both 
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subperiods although not by a statistically significant amount. Differences in performance are 
substantially higher in the 1997-2001 subperiod, suggesting that the outperformance of SRI 
funds that we document in this paper is largely driven by the first part of the sample period. We 
also investigate how our results are affected by the presence of SRI funds that perform little 
social screening. When we restrict the sample of SRI funds to include only those funds that 
perform intensive social screening, we obtain results similar to those obtained for the whole 
sample of SRI funds. Similarly, excluding funds that outsource social screening activities does 
not alter our conclusions regarding the differences between SRI and conventional funds. To 
control for management company effects, we compare SRI and conventional funds run by the 
same management company and find that performance differences become small and 
statistically insignificant. These results suggest that differences between SRI and conventional 
funds may be explained by management company-level factors that determine both fund 
performance and the company's decision to manage SRI funds. We further explore this issue by 
distinguishing between SRI funds run by management companies specialized in SRI and those 
run by generalist companies. Our results show that SRI funds managed by generalist companies 
actually underperform, both before and after fees, similar conventional funds, although the 
difference is not highly statistically significant in all specifications. SRI funds run by specialized 
management companies, however, outperform comparable conventional funds by more than 
2.6% annually. This difference is substantial and highly statistically significant in all 
specifications. These results are consistent with two different hypotheses. First, unobservable 
factors at the management company level could be associated with both the decision to 
specialize in SRI funds and higher fees and performance. In this case, socially responsible 
investing itself would not have any effect on performance or fees. Alternatively, socially 
responsible investing could be associated with superior performance but only management 
companies that specialize in SRI would be able to exploit this advantage.  
Most previous research has failed to find differences between the average performance of 
SRI and conventional funds in the US.2 Hamilton et al. (1993) find that young SRI funds 
outperform a random sample of conventional funds in the period 1981-1990 (with performance 
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defined as after-expense Jensen's alpha), although results revert for seasoned funds. Benson et 
al. (2006) use an eight-factor model to account for differences in industry allocations and find 
that SRI funds underperform randomly chosen conventional funds in the period 1994-2003. 
Neither of these studies documents statistically significant differences in performance. Statman 
(2000) compares the performance of a sample of SRI funds with that of a control group of 
conventional funds of similar size and reports that the average Jensen's alpha of SRI funds is 
higher than that of the control group in the period 1990-1998, although the difference is only 
marginally significant. Bauer et al. (2005) and Renneboog et al. (2008a) use Carhart's (1997) 
four-factor model to measure fund performance. Although Bauer et al. (2005) do not find 
significant differences in four-factor alpha between US SRI funds and conventional funds 
matched on age and size in the 1990-2001 period, they show that the difference in performance 
between SRI and conventional funds improves (and becomes significant) in the subperiod from 
1998 to 2001. Renneboog et al. (2008a) report no significant difference in four-factor alpha over 
their full 1991-2003 sample period. However, they find that SRI funds significantly 
underperform conventional funds in the 1991-1995 subperiod but outperform conventional 
funds in the 2000-2003 subperiod (although not by a statistically significant amount). The 
empirical evidence for other countries suggests that SRI funds do not outperform conventional 
funds (Gregory et al., 1997, Hamilton et al., 1993, Kreander et al., 2005, Bauer et al., 2007, 
Renneboog et al., 2008a).  
Fees have not received much explicit attention in the literature on SRI mutual funds. 
However, several papers report average expense ratios for SRI and conventional funds (Statman, 
2000; Bauer et al., 2005; Benson et al., 2006; Benson and Humphrey, 2008; Renneboog et al., 
2008a). In line with our results, none of these papers find significant differences in fees between 
SRI and comparable conventional funds with the exception of Benson and Humphrey (2008), 
who report that the median expense ratio is significantly higher for conventional funds.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we describe the fee structure of US mutual 
funds and the data set. In Section 2 we discuss how we estimate risk-adjusted returns. We 
describe the matching estimator methodology and our empirical results in Section 3. In Section 
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4 we analyze the role of management companies. Finally, we conclude in Section 5. 
 
1 Data  
 
1.1 The fee structure of US mutual funds  
 
Mutual funds charge two kinds of fees: expenses and loads. Expenses comprise the management 
fee (typically a fixed percentage of assets under management) and other recurring operating 
costs—such as custodian, administration, accounting, registration, and transfer agent fees. 
Rather than charging explicit fees for these expenses, funds deduct them on a daily basis from 
the fund's net assets. Expenses are expressed as a percentage of assets under management (the 
expense ratio). Loads are one-time fees used to compensate distributors. They are paid either at the 
time of purchasing (front-end load) or redeeming fund shares (back-end load) and computed as a 
fraction of the amount invested. 
Since the 1980s many funds charge 12b-1 fees, which are used to pay for marketing and 
distribution costs and are included in the fund's expense ratio. Many funds offer multiple share 
classes (such as A, B, or C classes) with different combinations of loads and 12b-1 fees. To 
approximate the total cost of mutual fund shares, we aggregate all the costs incurred by fund 
shareholders using the now standard total ownership cost (TOC) measure introduced by Sirri 
and Tufano (1998). To obtain this measure, we annuitize the total load by dividing it by the 
number of years that investors are expected to hold the mutual fund shares. Following Sirri and 
Tufano (1998), we assume a seven-year holding period, and, thus, define total ownership cost as 
TOC = expense ratio + (total load/7).  
 
1.2 Sample selection  
Our main source of data is the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free US Mutual Fund Database (see 
Carhart, 1997; Carhart et al., 2002; and Elton et al., 2001, for detailed discussions of the data 
set). We obtain monthly information on returns, and yearly information on fees and other fund 
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characteristics for all domestic, diversified, equity mutual funds in the database for the period 
December 1994-December 2005. We consider a fund to be a domestic, diversified, equity 
mutual fund if it belongs to any of the following Standard & Poor's Detailed Objective Codes as 
reported by CRSP: Aggressive Growth, Growth Mid Cap, Growth and Income, Growth, Small Company 
Growth.  
In the CRSP data set, different classes of the same fund appear as different funds. We 
identify the classes that belong to the same fund and obtain fund-level information by averaging 
(weighting the classes by total net assets) the class-level data provided by CRSP. We also 
exclude index funds from our sample. Since the index identifier in CRSP is only available as of 
2003, we use funds' names to determine whether they are index funds or not. For SRI funds, we 
double-check the classification manually to make sure that we do not unnecessarily delete SRI 
funds from the sample. We follow a similar procedure to identify institutional classes. Since 
funds often have both retail and institutional classes, we classify a fund as institutional if more 
than fifty percent of its assets are in institutional classes. Institutional funds are excluded from 
the sample.  
We obtain our list of SRI funds from the Social Investment Forum's (SIF) reports published 
in 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005.3 Each report contains comprehensive information about 
SRI in the US for both the publication year and the preceding one. In particular, the reports 
contain a list of SRI mutual funds compiled by SIF. To construct this list SIF employs a direct 
survey methodology and gathers information from third parties. A fund is included in the SIF 
list if it utilizes one or more social or environmental criteria as part of a formal investment 
policy.4 To be included in the list funds are required to provide written confirmation of social 
screening when not explicitly incorporated into the fund prospectus. Furthermore, SIF performs 
checks to exclude any institution that says it takes into account social or corporate governance 
criteria in its investment decisions but lacks a formal policy for doing so or has a policy but does 
not observe it.  
To build our sample of SRI funds, we first labeled a mutual fund as SRI in a given year if it 
was included in the corresponding SIF report. Some SRI funds included in some reports, 
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however, do not appear in others, despite being alive. We checked funds' prospectuses to 
identify whether these changes were due to changes in the SRI orientation of the funds and 
found that temporary exclusions from the reports were not associated with any significant 
change in reported investment strategy 5 Thus, we label a fund as SRI for the whole sample 
period if the fund appears at least once in the SIF reports.  
We obtain information from SIF on the social screening activity of SRI funds. SIF pro vides 
information about the use of screens in eleven screening categories: alcohol, tobacco, gambling, 
defense/ weapons, animal testing, products/services, environment, human rights, labor relations, 
employment/equality, and community investment. We also obtain information from SIF on whether 
social screening is performed in-house or delegated to an external firm. 
In our tests, we exclude from the sample those observations of SRI and conventional funds 
with missing values for risk-adjusted performance (Section 2 describes the procedure employed 
to estimate risk-adjusted performance), expenses, loads, or any of the control variables 
(investment objective, total net assets, age, and total net assets of the management company). 
An important feature of our sample is that it is free of survivorship bias, since the CRSP data set 
contains information on all funds operating during the entire sample period and since we 
obtained historical lists of SRI funds from SIF.  
Our final sample of actively managed, retail, domestic, US, equity mutual funds in the 
1997-2005 period contains a total of 455 SRI and 8,476 conventional fund-year observations, 
that correspond to 86 SRI funds and 1,761 conventional funds, respectively. Table 1 displays 
both the number and total assets under management for each group of funds by year. Table 2 
reveals several differences between SRI and conventional funds. First, average and median total 
loads are lower for SRI funds. Since almost 40% of all SRI funds and one third of all 
conventional funds in the sample never charge loads, we also compute the average and median 
total loads only for funds that charge positive loads and find that mean and median total loads 
are also lower for SRI load funds than for conventional load funds. Second, the companies that 
manage SRI funds are smaller than those managing conventional funds. Third, average size 
(measured as total net assets in millions of dollars) is larger, but median size smaller, for SRI 
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funds. Fourth, the turnover ratio (defined as the minimum of aggregate sales and aggregate 
purchases of securities, divided by the average 12-month total net assets of the fund) is 
substantially higher for conventional funds. Finally, both the before- and after-fee raw returns of 
conventional funds are slightly higher than those of SRI funds. 
 
2 Estimation of risk-adjusted returns 
Following a long list of studies in the mutual fund performance evaluation literature, 6 we 
employ Carhart's (1997) four-factor model to estimate risk-adjusted performance: 
 
ittiyprtihmltismbtirmiit yprhmlsmbrmr εββββα +++++= 1,1,,,  
 
where rit is fund i's before-expense return in month t in excess of the 30-day risk-free interest 
rate-proxied by Ibbotson's one-month Treasury bill rate; rm t is the market portfolio return in 
excess of the risk-free rate; and smb t and hml t denote the return on portfolios that proxy for 
common risk factors associated with size and book-to-market, respectively. The term pr1y t is the 
return difference between stocks with high and low returns in the previous year, and is included 
to account for passive momentum strategies by mutual funds. 7 The term α i is the four-factor 
alpha and captures the fund's risk-adjusted performance according to Carhart's model. For 
comparison with previous studies, we also consider Jensen's alpha, estimated using the market 
return rm t as the single risk factor.  
We follow Carhart's (1997) two-stage estimation procedure to obtain a panel of monthly 
fund risk-adjusted performance estimates. In the first stage, for every month, t, in years 1997-
2005, we regress fund excess returns on the risk factors over the previous three years. If less 
than three years of previous data are available for a specific fund-month, we require a minimum 
of 30 monthly observations in the previous three years. In the second stage, we estimate a fund's 
risk-adjusted performance in month t as the difference between the fund's before-expense excess 
return and the realized risk premium, defined as the vector of betas times the vector of factor 
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realizations in month t. Finally, we obtain each fund's risk-adjusted performance as the average 
of the annualized monthly alphas over the fund's life in the sample. 
 
3 Differences between SRI funds and conventional funds  
 
3.1 Empirical strategy  
 
The ideal experiment to evaluate the impact of socially responsible investing on performance 
and fees would be to observe the same funds both with and without the SRI constraint. Most 
previous studies (Gregory et al., 1997; Statman, 2000; Kreander et al., 2005; Bauer et al., 2005) 
approximate the ideal experiment by comparing the performance of SRI funds to that of a 
control group of comparable conventional funds, a methodology that is known as matched-pair 
analysis. More precisely, each SRI fund is matched to one or several conventional funds with 
similar values of one or more matching variables. The difference between SRI and conventional 
funds is then estimated by averaging the differences between each SRI fund and the 
corresponding matched conventional funds. Finding control observations, however, is not easy 
when matching is done on several control variables, since exact or nearly exact matches for all 
variables and observations are rare even in large data sets (Zhao, 2004). In this paper, we 
employ the bias-adjusted matching estimator developed by Abadie and Imbens (2006), which 
overcomes this difficulty. The matching estimator analysis maps the multiple matching variables 
into a single number that measures the distance to the observation to be matched and selects as 
control observations those with the lowest value for this distance. Matching estimators, 
therefore, make it possible to use several matching variables simultaneously. 8 The bias-adjusted 
matching estimator of Abadie and Imbens further corrects the potential bias arising from the 
difference in the matching variables by explicitly taking into account how the variable of 
interest (fees or performance) is related to the matching variables.9  
To estimate the differences between SRI and conventional funds, we first compute for each 
fund the average value over the sample period of each of the different measures of performance 
and fees and fund turnover (the outcome variables). We then match each SRI fund with 
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conventional funds that, in the year in which the SRI fund first appears in the sample, have the 
same investment objective as the SRI fund and have similar age, size, and size of the fund's 
management company. Therefore, we match SRI funds with conventional funds that are initially 
similar and estimate the differences over time in performance and fees between the initially 
similar funds. We report results for simple and biased-adjusted estimators obtained using one 
and four matches per SRI fund. The one-match procedure is the one that most closely 
approximates the matched-pair methodology used in previous studies and it maximizes the 
quality of the matches, although at the cost of a small sample size. In some specifications, we 
use two, rather than four matches, because of a low number of available fund-year observations. 
 
3.2 Differences in before-fee performance  
 
In Panel A of Table 3, we report the average before-fee performance of all SRI and all 
conventional funds in the sample. The results indicate that SRI funds on average outperform 
conventional funds before fees by 89 bp, 1.03%, and 1.43% in terms of unadjusted returns, one-
factor alpha, and four-factor alpha, respectively. However, the difference in these unconditional 
means is statistically significant only when performance is measured using the four-factor alpha.  
Panel A in Table 4 reports our estimates of the difference in before-fee performance 
between SRI and conventional funds using the matching estimators methodology. The 
difference in raw (risk-unadjusted) before-fee returns between SRI funds and similar 
conventional funds is negligible in all specifications and not statistically significant in any of 
them. SRI funds also earn higher one-factor alphas, although the difference is statistically 
significant only in some of the specifications. However, differences in four-factor alpha are 
statistically significant in all specifications. They are also larger than those estimated for raw 
returns and economically significant: SRI funds earn an annual four-factor alpha that is between 
0.96% and 1.83% higher than the one earned by matched conventional funds. This difference is 
substantial, considering that the mean four-factor alpha for SRI funds is 0.58%.  
We can extract two conclusions from Panel A of Table 4. First, the facts that differences in 
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raw performance are negligible, but differences in risk-adjusted four-factor alpha are substantial 
and statistically significant show that SRI and conventional funds differ in their exposure to the 
different risk factors. In unreported results we find that the main difference between SRI and 
conventional funds is that SRI funds exhibit a smaller exposure to the momentum factor. 
Second, the risk-adjusted before-fee returns of SRI funds are higher than those of comparable 
conventional funds. We consider several possible explanations for this result.  
First, the large size of the investment universe faced by fund managers implies that they 
must make choices about the breadth and depth of their analysis. Restricting the investment 
universe may prove optimal if depth is relatively more profitable than breadth (see 
Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2005). Recent evidence showing that fund families following 
more focused investment strategies (Nanda et al., 2004) and mutual funds holding portfolios 
concentrated in specific industries tend to perform better (Kacperczyk et al., 2005) provides 
support for this hypothesis. Mutual funds' preference for investing in firms with headquarters 
located near those of the management company (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, 2001) also 
provides support for the idea that fund managers often choose to restrict their investment 
universe. The performance premium of SRI funds could, thus, stem from the gains from 
specialization induced by their investment restrictions. SRI constraints could also have a 
positive impact on performance if limiting the set of investment opportunities reduces excessive 
trading. The transaction costs generated by excessive trading are directly deducted from funds' 
assets (transaction costs are not part of fund expenses) and, thus, directly affect before-fee 
returns. To explore this possibility, we estimate the difference between the turnover ratio of SRI 
and conventional funds and find (Panel B in Table 4) that SRI funds have a lower portfolio 
turnover than comparable conventional funds. However, the difference in turnover cannot 
explain the performance difference between SRI and conventional funds, as shown in Table 4 
(Panel A), which reports the estimated differences in before-fee (but net of transaction costs) 
performance between SRI and conventional funds when turnover is used as an additional 
matching variable.  
The performance advantage of SRI funds could also be explained by differences in the 
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severity of the conflict of interest between investors (who seek high risk-adjusted returns) and 
fund managers (who want to maximize fee revenues net of management costs). If SRI is 
associated with better fund governance, and if agency problems have a significant effect on 
performance, then SRI funds could exhibit better performance than conventional funds.  
Finally, the requirements that a fund has to fulfill in order to be included in the SIF's listing 
of SRI funds are not stringent. For example, a fund could be on the list just by having a formal 
policy of excluding companies with interests in the tobacco business. If the constraints that SRI 
(as defined in our data set) imposes on fund managers are minor, the performance of SRI mutual 
funds should not be expected to be lower than that of conventional funds. It is important to 
highlight that the estimated performance differences between SRI and conventional funds 
cannot be explained by (nor require) a performance premium for socially responsible firms. If 
these firms yielded higher risk-adjusted returns, conventional funds could obtain returns as high 
as those of SRI funds by investing in SRI firms, since conventional funds are not restricted to 
investing in firms that are not socially responsible.10 
 
3.3 Differences in fees 
Even if socially responsible investment does not impose a cost on SRI fund investors in terms of 
reduced before-fee financial performance, these investors could still pay an explicit price for 
their funds' social responsibility in the form of higher fees. Indeed, there are reasons to expect 
fees charged by SRI funds to be higher. First, some SRI funds actively engage with the firms in 
which they invest to encourage them to pursue socially responsible policies. The costs of such 
active monitoring may be partly passed on to investors in the form of higher expenses. Second, 
investors concerned about social responsibility may be willing to pay a premium for the SRI 
attribute. Finally, investors in SRI funds may differ from other investors in their sensitivity to 
financial performance. It is well known that investor sensitivity to performance differs across 
funds (Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Further, Christofersen and Musto (2002) and Gil-Bazo and 
Ruiz-Verdú (2009) show that fund fees are higher in funds facing less performance-sensitive 
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investors. Therefore, if SRI fund investors were less sensitive to after-fee performance, one 
would expect SRI funds to charge higher fees. The empirical evidence on the performance 
sensitivity of SRI mutual fund investors, however, is mixed. Bollen (2007) finds that flows of 
money to SRI funds in the US are more sensitive to performance than flows to conventional 
funds when returns in the previous year are positive, and less sensitive when past returns are 
negative. Renneboog et al. (2006) report similar evidence for a sample of international funds, 
although they also find that flows of money to SRI funds are not negatively affected by fund 
management fees or loads, contrary to conventional funds. However, more recent evidence for 
the US market (Benson and Humphrey, 2008) suggests that, overall, SRI fund flow is less 
sensitive to returns than conventional fund flow. These authors, however, also find little 
differences in sensitivity to fund expenses, which is low both for conventional and SRI funds.  
Panel C in Table 3 reports the average expenses for all SRI funds and all conventional funds 
in the sample. The average expense ratio of the sample of SRI funds is slightly lower than the 
average expense ratio in the sample of all conventional funds and the difference is not 
statistically significant. Table 5 contains the results of the matching estimator analysis for 
differences in fees. In line with the comparison of the unconditional means, the table shows that 
the difference in the expense ratio of SRI and similar conventional funds is negligible. Thus, 
while the average expense ratio of SRI funds is 134.45 basis points, estimated differences range 
between -1.31 and -3.57 basis points. Further, none of the differences are statistically significant 
at conventional significance levels.  
From these results, however, one cannot conclude that investors in SRI funds pay the same 
fees as those investing in conventional funds, since, on top of expenses, mutual funds often 
charge loads. To address this issue and shed light on the pricing policies of SRI and 
conventional funds, we estimate the difference in the loads charged by SRI and conventional 
funds. As we report in Table 5, there is no conclusive evidence that SRI and conventional funds 
charge different loads. While SRI funds are estimated to charge higher loads when we perform a 
single match per SRI fund, the estimated difference turns negative when we use four matches. 
Further, the difference is not statistically significant in both cases. To complete the analysis, we 
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also estimate the difference in total ownership costs, which include both expenses and loads. As 
expected from the previous results, differences in total ownership costs are small and not 
statistically significant. Our conclusions do not change if, instead of a seven-year holding 
period, we assume that investors hold their shares for either five or ten years.11  
We can conclude from Table 5 that SRI funds do not charge significantly higher fees than 
their conventional counterparts. Why this is the case is an open question. One possibility is that 
the price sensitivity of US investors in SRI funds does not differ from that of investors in 
conventional funds, as suggested by Benson and Humphrey (2008) (who, however, find that SRI 
investors are less sensitive to performance). Our results are also compatible with investors in 
SRI funds being willing to pay a premium for SRI funds (which would increase average fees for 
these funds) and at the same time being more sensitive to fees (which would reduce average fees 
for these funds), because the smaller number of SRI funds as compared to conventional funds 
makes price comparisons easier for SRI funds or because investors in SRI funds are more 
financially sophisticated. However, our results could also be compatible with a lower price 
sensitivity by SRI investors (which would lead, other things equal, to higher fees) together with 
a greater regard for investors' interests by SRI fund management companies (which would lead, 
other things equal, to lower fees). Finally, given the relatively small size of the SRI sample, the 
lack of a statistically significant difference in fees between SRI and matched conventional funds 
could also be due to sampling error.  
 
3.4 Differences in after-fee performance  
 
The results above show, on the one hand, that SRI funds outperform comparable conventional 
funds before fees and, on the other hand, that SRI funds do not charge higher fees. Panel B in 
Table 3 shows that average after-fee performance is higher in the sample of SRI funds than in 
the sample of all conventional funds: SRI funds outperform conventional funds on average by 
1.04% if performance is measured as one-factor alpha and by 1.44% in terms of four-factor 
alpha. Further, the difference is statistically significant at the 10% level for the one-factor alpha 
15 
 
and at the 1% level for the four-factor alpha. Panel C in Table 4 shows the results of the 
matching estimator analysis for differences in after-fee performance. Again, we find results in 
line with those obtained from the comparison of the unconditional means. The after-fee 
performance of SRI funds is higher than that of matched conventional funds for both 
performance measures. Although the difference in one-factor net alpha is not significant in all 
cases, estimated differences in four-factor after-fee alphas are significant and substantial in all 
specifications (between 0.99% and 1.85%). Therefore, SRI funds outperform similar 
conventional funds both before and after fees in terms of four-factor alphas.  
Our results for one-factor alphas are consistent with previous studies of the US market that 
report differences in this measure of performance (e.g., Statman, 2000; Bauer et al., 2005; 
Renneboog et al., 2008a). Like those studies, we cannot conclude unambiguously that the 
performance of SRI funds differs from that of conventional funds when measured as one 
factor alpha, although we do find a performance advantage for SRI funds that is statistically 
significant in some of our comparisons.  
Our results for four-factor alphas can be compared to those reported by Bauer et al. (2005) 
and Renneboog et al. (2008a) since these authors also use Carhart's (1997) four-factor model to 
estimate risk-adjusted performance and some of the subperiods that they study overlap with our 
sample period. As mentioned in the introduction, Bauer et al. (2005) find that SRI funds 
significantly outperform conventional funds matched on age and size in the 1998-2001 
subperiod, while Renneboog et al. (2008a) find that SRI funds outperformed conventional funds 
in the 2000-2003 subperiod, although not by a statistically significant amount. Therefore, our 
results are closer to those of Bauer et al. (2005) in that we also find evidence that SRI funds 
have significantly outperformed conventional funds in terms of four-factor alphas. 
 
3.5 Robustness Checks  
 
3.5.1 Analysis by subperiods  
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Previous studies have reported different results when comparing SRI and conventional funds in 
different subperiods (e.g., Bauer et al., 2005; Renneboog et al., 2008a). These findings suggest 
that different sample periods may lead to different conclusions about the performance of SRI 
funds relative to that of conventional funds. To evaluate the extent to which our results are 
driven by part of the sample period, we split the sample period in two subperiods. The first 
subperiod covers the first five years of our sample (1997 to 2001) and the second subperiod 
covers the last four years (2002 to 2005). We report the results of the matching estimator 
analysis by subperiods in Table 6.  
In the subperiod from 1997 to 2001 SRI funds outperform comparable conventional funds 
by more than 1% both before and after expenses. SRI funds also charge fees that exceed those of 
conventional funds with similar characteristics, but the difference is small (between 3.5 and 8.5 
bp). Neither differences in performance nor differences in fees are statistically significant. The 
lack of statistical significance, however, could be caused by the fact that by splitting the sample 
we reduce sample size and, therefore, the power of the tests.  
In the last four years of the sample, we also find that SRI funds outperform matched 
conventional funds both before and after fees. However, the difference is smaller than in the first 
subperiod in all specifications. SRI funds also have a higher ownership cost than matched 
conventional funds but the difference is negligible. As in the first subperiod none of the 
differences are statistically significant. We may, therefore, conclude that the outperformance of 
SRI funds documented for our entire sample period is mainly driven by the first part of the 
sample period.  
To explore further how performance differences between SRI and conventional funds have 
evolved over time, we also perform a year-by-year analysis. For every year in our sample 
period, we obtain the matching estimator (one match, bias corrected) of the difference in before-
fee four-factor alphas. In unreported results, we find that the before-fee risk-adjusted 
performance of SRI funds exceeds that of conventional funds every year in the sample period, 
although the difference is statistically significant in only three years.12  
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3.5.2 Matching Procedure  
A possible concern about our results is that they may be sensitive to the moment in which we 
match each SRI fund with the corresponding conventional funds. As discussed by Kreander et 
al. (2005), the quality of the matches worsens for periods that are far away from the time of 
matching. In small samples, this lower quality of the matches may lead to imprecise estimates 
and, potentially, the choice of matching period may also introduce biases. For example, if SRI 
funds do not have the same life span as the conventional funds with which they are matched, 
survivorship biases may emerge (see, e.g., Gregory and Whittaker, 2007). Further, differences in 
life spans may also introduce biases because estimated average performance is time-varying. 
Indeed, Lynch and Wachter (2007) show that mutual fund performance moves with the business 
cycle. Apparent differences in performance could thus arise because the performance of SRI and 
conventional funds is measured over different periods.  
To check whether our results are robust to these potential problems, we also match each SRI 
fund-year observation with conventional fund-year observations of the same year, with the same 
investment objective, and with similar fund size, age, and size of the fund's management 
company (all in logs). That is, we compare fund-year observations of SRI funds with 
contemporaneous fund-year observations of conventional funds with similar characteristics. In 
results not reported, but available from the authors upon request, we find that the risk-adjusted 
performance of SRI funds, measured as annual four-factor alpha, is higher than that of similar 
conventional funds both before and after fees. Further, the estimated differences are similar to 
those reported in Table 4 and highly statistically significant. We also obtain essentially the same 
results for turnover and when we use turnover as a matching variable in the estimation of 
performance differences. As in Table 5, we estimate very small fee differences between SRI and 
conventional funds. However, these differences are consistently positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that SRI funds might charge higher fees than similar conventional funds. 
This last result, however, should be interpreted with care, since statistical significance is likely 
to be greatly overstated when we match fund-year observations. The reason for this 
overstatement is that when matching fund-year observations, we use several observations of the 
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same fund. Since fees are very persistent over time, observations of the same fund will be 
strongly correlated. This strong correlation, in turn, implies that the standard errors of the 
coefficients are likely to be underestimated and, as a result, that the statistical significance of the 
estimated coefficients is likely to be overstated (see Petersen, 2009, for a discussion of this issue 
in the context of regression analysis). In any case, the economic significance of the differences 
is small and it does not alter the result that SRI funds have a higher after-fee performance than 
similar conventional funds.  
 
3.5.3 Social Screening Intensity  
As mentioned in Subsection 3.2, funds with little social screening are not likely to differ too 
much from conventional funds, so their inclusion in the SRI sample could conceal otherwise 
large differences between SRI and conventional funds. A similar concern could be raised about 
funds in which social screening is outsourced rather than performed in-house by the fund's 
management company. To investigate this possibility, we use the information provided by SIF 
on the screens employed by SRI funds and on whether screening is carried out in-house or 
outsourced, and perform separate analyses for different groups of SRI funds. Unfortunately, 
information on screen categories and on the venue of social screening is available for only 28 
and 30 funds in our SRI sample, respectively. Therefore, our analysis is limited by the size and 
representativeness of these subsamples.  
Results in Table 7 show that SRI funds with intensive screening (defined as those that use a 
number of screens greater than or equal to the sample median of 10 screens) outperform their 
conventional counterparts, although this difference is not significant in all specifications.13 
Furthermore, these funds outperform their control group of conventional funds by a higher 
amount than funds with fewer screens. Unlike moderately screened funds, intensively screened 
funds are more expensive than their conventional control group, although this difference is not 
statistically significant.  
Results in Table 8 suggest that both SRI funds that do all social screening in-house and 
funds that use some external screening outperform their conventional peers, although these 
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differences are not significant in some specifications for funds using in-house screening.14 
Estimated differences in total ownership costs between SRI and conventional funds are neither 
significant nor clearly larger for either group of SRI funds.  
Therefore, excluding from the SRI sample funds that use few screens or funds that outsource 
the screening activity does not yield qualitatively different results from those reported in Tables 
4 and 5.15  
 
4 The role of management companies  
 
Previous sections, as well as extant work on the performance of SRI mutual funds, compare SRI 
mutual funds with conventional funds that have similar characteristics. Mutual fund 
performance and fees, however, are not determined exclusively at the level of the individual 
fund. Mutual funds are operated by management companies, and the resources, policies, and 
culture of these companies play an important role in the determination of individual funds' 
performance and fees. Management companies differ in their ability to attract and retain talented 
managers, the incentives provided to these managers, the availability of supporting staff, their 
technology, their ability to negotiate prices with other service providers (such as brokers), their 
advertising policies, and the governance of their funds.16 In previous sections, we partly 
controlled for the influence of the management company by including management company 
size as one of the matching variables. Using observable company characteristics as matching 
variables, however, may be insufficient to control for those management company traits most 
relevant for the determination of performance or fees.  
To filter out the impact of unobserved management company heterogeneity, we match SRI 
funds with conventional funds with similar size and age, and managed by the same management 
company. As reported in Table 9, differences in performance, both before and after fees, 
between SRI and similar conventional funds run by the same company are not statistically 
significant. They are also smaller than the corresponding estimated differences reported in Table 
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4. The differences in performance between SRI and conventional funds reported in previous 
sections, therefore, might be largely explained by differences in unobserved characteristics of 
management companies that are more likely to offer one type of fund or the other. However, our 
results also show that SRI funds have a lower total ownership cost than conventional funds 
managed by the same management company and the difference (of at least 22 basis points) is 
both statistically and economically significant.17 Therefore, management companies that offer 
both conventional and SRI funds do not seem to charge a fee premium for the latter. On the 
contrary, SRI funds are cheaper than similar conventional funds.  
These results, however, should be interpreted with care. First, the subsample of funds 
employed to obtain these results is substantially smaller than the full sample. In particular, while 
there are 86 SRI funds and 1,761 conventional funds in the original sample, the subsample of 
management companies offering both types of funds contains 27 SRI and 108 conventional 
funds, respectively. Thus, restricting the set of conventional funds that can serve as controls to 
those in the same management company as the corresponding SRI fund necessarily leads to 
poorer matches. Further, the restricted subsample of SRI and conventional funds may not be 
representative of the whole population. Indeed, funds run by management companies offering 
both types of funds are both larger and older than funds in the unrestricted sample.  
As a second approach to determine the role of fund management companies, we hypothesize 
that management company specialization in the management of SRI funds is key in explaining 
the differences between SRI and conventional funds. Under this assumption, we can use 
companies' degree of specialization to control for relevant management company characteristics 
without requiring control observations to belong to the same management company. To do this, 
we divide the sample of SRI funds into two subsamples: one containing funds managed by 
companies that specialize in SRI funds (defined as those that have more than 50% of their assets 
in SRI funds) and the other one containing funds managed by generalist companies (which 
manage SRI funds, but have less than 50% of their assets in this type of fund). We would like to 
compare SRI funds with similar conventional funds run by the same type of management 
company (specialized or generalist). Unfortunately, there are only five conventional funds run 
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by companies specialized in SRI funds, which are not enough to match 66 SRI funds run by this 
type of management company. Therefore, we perform this kind of comparison only for 
generalist companies. Panel A of Table 10 shows that SRI funds run by generalist companies 
underperform, both before and after fees, conventional funds also run by generalist companies 
by an amount between 3.09% and 4.24%, although these differences are not statistically 
significant when we do not use the bias correction procedure. SRI funds are associated with a 
higher total ownership cost, but, again, this difference (between 3.47 and 5.62 basis points) is 
small and not statistically significant. These results are, therefore, in line with those of Table 9, 
and suggest that management company characteristics may explain the performance differences 
between SRI and conventional funds that we find when we analyze the whole sample SRI funds.  
Our results, however, are still subject to the criticism that funds in generalist companies may 
not be representative of the rest of the population. For instance, conventional funds in generalist 
companies could have higher performance and fees than conventional funds managed by other 
kinds of companies. In order to discard this possibility, we also compare SRI funds in generalist 
companies with matched conventional funds run by all management companies. As Panel B of 
Table 10 shows, differences in before- and after-expense performance between SRI funds in 
generalist companies and matched conventional funds from the whole sample are slightly 
smaller than those reported in Panel A, but they are estimated more precisely (all performance 
differences are statistically significant at the 5% or 10% level) thanks to the larger sample of 
potential matches. The coefficients for the difference in total ownership cost once again change 
sign and are not statistically significant.  
These results suggest that the differences between SRI and conventional funds reported in 
Section 3 are fully driven by SRI funds run by management companies specialized in SRI. 
Indeed, when we compare SRI funds run by specialized management companies with matched 
conventional funds run by all management companies (Panel C of Table 10), we find that SRI 
funds outperform conventional funds by as much as 2.76% before expenses and 2.70% after 
expenses and all differences are highly statistically significant. The total ownership cost of SRI 
funds exceeds that of matched conventional funds by less than 10 basis points and the difference 
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is not statistically significant. Results (available from the authors upon request) are almost 
identical if specialized management companies are defined as those in which SRI funds 
represent 75% of total assets under management or more, and generalist companies as those 
with less than 75% of assets in SRI funds.  
There are two possible explanations for the results of Table 10. First, companies that are 
more likely to deliver higher risk-adjusted returns and charge higher fees could also be more 
likely to specialize in SRI funds. For instance, more ethical management companies could be 
less prone to act against investors' interests, which would result in better performance. At the 
same time, they could be more inclined to manage SRI funds. SRI funds operated by these 
companies could, thus, outperform conventional funds, even if socially responsible investing per 
se did not increase performance. According to the second explanation, socially responsible 
investing itself would deliver superior performance, but this superiority would only be realized 
by management companies specialized in SRI. If the superior performance and higher fees of 
SRI funds in specialized management companies were due to the specific characteristics of these 
management companies and not to the SRI nature of these funds, then we would observe no 
differences between SRI funds and conventional funds in specialized companies. As mentioned 
above, however, we cannot perform this comparison due to the low number of conventional 
funds run by management companies specialized in SRI.  
We note that the percentage of SRI funds that is run by specialized management companies 
goes down from 87% in 1997 to 76% in 2005. If this trend continues, we may expect the 
average performance of all SRI funds to become closer to that of similar conventional funds.  
It is important to note that our results do not imply that the optimal strategy for mutual fund 
investors is to invest in SRI funds managed by specialized companies. First, while the average 
performance of SRI funds is higher than that of conventional funds, the best conventional funds 
could still outperform the best SRI funds. If investors were able to detect the best performers, it 
would then be optimal, from the point of view of financial performance, to invest only in 
conventional funds. Further, while SRI funds perform better on average than similar 
conventional funds, the best conventional funds may be very different in size or age from 
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conventional funds and, thus, may not be included in our control group. We cannot rule out that 
investing in these funds may yield a higher performance than investing in SRI funds. Indeed, 
Geczy et al. (2005) show that an optimal investment strategy in conventional funds may 
outperform a similarly optimal investment in SRI funds, while Renneboog et al. (2008a) report 
that the performance of a "smart-money" portfolio of SRI funds (constructed by tracking the 
inflows of new money into mutual funds) does not differ from that of a "smart-money" portfolio 
of conventional funds.  
 
5 Concluding Remarks  
 
In this paper we revisit the question of whether mutual funds constrained by a socially 
responsible investment strategy underperform mutual funds not subject to that constraint. To 
address this question, we separately investigate the contributions of before-fee performance and 
fees to the financial performance of SRI funds, and explicitly analyze the role played by mutual 
fund management companies in explaining observed differences between SRI and conventional 
funds. To obtain our results, we apply the matching estimator methodology to a panel of US 
equity funds in the period 1997-2005.  
We provide evidence that investors do not pay a price, in the form of reduced performance, 
for investing in SRI mutual funds. On the contrary, investors in SRI funds have earned a 
premium in terms of superior risk-adjusted performance relative to that of similar conventional 
funds both before and after fees. At the same time, there is no conclusive evidence that SRI 
funds charge higher fees. We find, however, that the performance premium of SRI funds with 
respect to conventional funds is entirely due to SRI funds operated by management companies 
that specialize in the management of SRI funds. While SRI funds operated by companies 
specialized in SRI significantly outperform their conventional peers, SRI funds run by generalist 
companies underperform similar conventional funds. We also find that the difference in 
performance between SRI and conventional funds documented for the full 1997-2005 period is 
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mainly due to the superiority of SRI funds in the first part of the sample period.  
These results are of practical significance for investors. First, they show that SRI funds may 
outperform similar conventional funds. And second, they suggest that investors should take into 
account management company characteristics, particularly their specialization in SRI, when 
investing in SRI funds.  
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Notes  
 
1Bauer et al. (2005) and Renneboog et al. (2008a) have previously studied the effect of fees on 
differences in performance between SRI and conventional funds by distinguishing between 
before-fee and after-fee performance.  
 
2See Renneboog et al. (2008b) for a comprehensive survey of the literature on SRI.  
 
3We thank Todd Larsen from SIF for providing the reports on which our list of SRI funds is 
based.  
 
4See SIF (2005) for a complete description of their methodology.  
 
27 
 
5For instance, the mutual fund Lutheran Brotherhood Opportunity Growth Fund was included in SIF 
reports from 1997 to 2001, but was no longer included in subsequent reports. Similarly, the fund 
Fidelity Select Environmental was only included in the SIF report of 2005, although it had been 
operating since 1997. Our inspection of the funds' prospectuses did not reveal any change in the 
orientation of these funds.  
 
6Bauer et al. (2005) and Renneboog et al. (2008a) have recently used this model to evaluate the 
performance of SRI funds.  
 
7Data were downloaded from Kenneth French's website, http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu 
/pages/faculty/ken.french/.  
 
8To account for differences in the units used to measure each matching variable and in the 
dispersion of these variables, the distance metric employed scales the distance according to each 
of the matching variables by its variance (a procedure also recently employed by Bollen, 2007). 
More precisely, if the matching variables are size (s), age (a) and size of the management 
company (c), the distance between funds A and B would be:  
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
2
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BA ccaassd σσσ
−+−+−=  
where 2kσ  is the sample variance of variable k.  
 
9For a more detailed discussion of the matching estimators analysis and a comparison to other 
methods, see Imbens (2004). For an implementation of the matching estimator used in this 
paper, see Abadie et al. (2004).  
 
10A notable exception is the Vice Fund, which focuses on firms in the alcohol, gambling, tobacco, 
and military sectors.  
 
11Results are available from the authors upon request.  
 
12These results are available from the authors upon request.  
 
13As discussed above, however, the power of the tests is likely to be small due to the small size 
of the subsample of SRI funds. We note that results are robust to different definitions of 
intensive screening.  
 
14Renneboog et al. (2008a) report that in-house screening is associated with higher risk-adjusted 
returns for their sample of SRI funds from 23 countries. Renneboog et al. (2008a) also 
investigate the impact of different types of social screens and of screening intensity and obtain 
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mixed results.  
 
15We use additional information on the types of screens used by SRI funds (no investment, 
restricted investment, and positive investment) to perform further robustness tests: We partition 
the sample of SRI funds according to the number or fraction of positive screens used, and 
perform cluster analysis to divide the sample into groups with homogeneous screening activity. 
In our sample, these different methods lead to partitions of the sample and to estimated 
differences between SRI and conventional funds that are very similar to those obtained when we 
divide the sample by the number of screens used.  
 
16Mutual funds' boards are picked by the management company that runs the fund and many or 
all funds operated by a management company share the same board.  
 
17We note that we obtain the same results (not reported) if we do the matching by fund-year 
observation rather than by fund.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Number and total net assets of SRI and conventional funds  
The table shows the number and total net assets (TNA) of SRI and conventional funds in the sample per 
year. Total net assets are reported in millions of US dollars.  
 
 SRI Funds  Conventional Funds  
 Number of funds TNA  Number of funds TNA 
1997 31  88,774   660  1,008,553  
1998 41  111,272   736  1,288,145  
1999 42  115,505   824  1,717,278  
2000 47  99,517   921  1,670,100  
2001 56  55,113   1,005  1,457,958  
2002 61  36,573   1,102  1,138,293  
2003 59  104,947   1,077  1,404,566  
2004 60  120,962   1,091  1,637,126  
2005 58  141,550   1,060  1,749,477  
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 Table 2: Descriptive statistics  
The table shows descriptive statistics for the SRI and conventional funds in the sample.  S.D. denotes 
standard deviation. Expense ratio and Total loads are reported as percentages. Total loads are the total of all 
maximum front, deferred, and redemption fees as reported by CRSP. Load funds are defined as funds 
with a strictly positive value for total loads. Total net assets by fund (TNA, funds) and by management 
company (TNA, mgmt. co.) are reported in millions of US dollars. Age is reported in years.  Turnover stands 
for the fund's turnover ratio, defined as the minimum of aggregate sales and aggregate purchases of 
securities, divided by the average 12-month total net assets of the fund.  Net returns are the fund's annual 
returns computed as the sum of monthly returns as reported by CRSP, which are net of expenses. Gross 
returns are defined as net returns plus the expense ratio. The sample contains 86 SRI funds and 1,761 
conventional funds. There are 52 SRI funds and 1,177 conventional funds with a strictly positive total 
loads for at least one year. The sample period goes from 1997 to 2005.  
 
 Mean S.D. Median Mean S.D. Median 
Expense ratio 1.34% 0.47% 1.40% 1.36% 0.47% 1.30% 
Total  loads (all funds) 1.82% 2.29% 0.42% 2.13% 2.25% 1.00% 
Total  loads (load funds) 3.00% 2.25% 2.90% 3.19% 2.05% 3.81% 
       
TNA, funds 1,485  6,402  196  1,034  3,610  207  
TNA, mgmt. co. 
 
10,747  30,315  2,364  25,867  72,808  4,699  
Age 11.74  12.77  7.50  11.39  11.65  7.00  
Turnover 0.709  0.601  0.588  0.982  1.100  0.740  
       
Net returns 8.10% 8.32% 8.61% 7.20% 9.54% 7.90% 
 9.44% 8.22% 9.82% 8.55% 9.50% 9.18% 
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 Table 3: Differences between SRI and all conventional funds.  
The table shows the mean values of several variables of interest for all SRI funds and all conventional 
funds, as well as differences in means between the two groups. The variables are different measures of 
before-expense performance (Panel A), after-expense performance (Panel B), and fees (Panel C). A 
positive sign indicates that the value of the variable is higher for SRI funds. 1- and 4-factor alphas are 
annual Jensen's and Carhart's alphas, respectively, and are reported as percentages. Fees are in basis 
points. One, two, and three asterisks denote that the difference is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% significance levels, respectively, according to the Welch-Satterthwaite t-test for equality of means 
of two populations with unequal variances. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. We also report the 
p-value for the Mann-Whitney (or Wilcoxon) rank sum test.  
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
 
Mean 
 
P-value 
 
 SRI Conventional Diff. (Mann-Whitney  test) 
Panel A:  Before-fee Performance     
Gross Returns 9.44  8.55  0.89  0.60  
       
(0.915) 
 
Gross Alpha,  1 factor 1.808 0.78  1.03  0.63  
       
(0.633) 
 
Gross Alpha,  4 factors 0.58  -0.85 1.43*** 0.01  
       
(0.510) 
 
Panel B:  After-Fee Performance     
Net alpha,  1 factor 0.46  -0.57 1.04* 0.63  
       
(0.624) 
 
Net Alpha,  4 factors -0.77 -2.21 1.44*** 0.01  
       
(0.509) 
 
Panel C:  Fees     
Expenses 134.45 135.58  -1.13 0.66  
       
(5.180) 
 
Total  Loads 181.55 213.34  -31.79 0.22  
     
(25.220)
 
Total  Ownership  Cost 160.38 166.05  -5.67 0.79  
       
(6.960) 
 
Fund  Observations 86  1,761    
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Table 4: Matching estimator analysis for before-expense performance, fund turnover and after-
expense performance. 
The table shows the matching estimator results (coefficient, standard error, and mean of the outcome variable for the 
SRI group) for differences between SRI and matched conventional funds in:  before-expense performance (Panel A), 
fund turnover (Panel B), and after-expense performance (Panel C). A positive sign indicates that the value of the 
outcome variable is higher for SRI funds.  Matching variables include year, investment objective, fund age and total 
net assets (both in logs), and management company total net assets (in logs). 1- and 4-factor alphas are annual 
Jensen's and Carhart's alphas, respectively, and are reported as percentages.  
 
 Simple  Bias Corrected 
 1 match 4 matches  1 match 4 matches 
Panel A:  Before-fee performance      
Gross Returns      
Coeff. 0.14  -0.07  0.16  -0.08 
S.e. 1.07  0.88   1.06  0.88  
Mean (SRI) 9.44  9.44   9.44  9.44  
      
Gross Alpha,  1 factor  
Coeff. 2.04** 0.96   2.06** 0.82  
S.e. 0.91  0.72   0.91  0.72  
Mean (SRI) 1.81  1.81   1.81  1.81  
      
Gross Alpha,  4 factors  
Coeff. 1.79*** 1.03*  1.83*** 0.96* 
S.e. 0.67  0.57   0.67  0.57  
Mean (SRI) 0.58  0.58   0.58  0.58  
      
Gross Alpha,  4 factors (turnover)  
Coeff. 1.49** 1.19**  1.52** 1.20** 
S.e. 0.65  0.53   0.66  0.53  
Mean (SRI) 0.58  0.58   0.58  0.58  
Panel B:  Portfolio turnover  
Coeff. -0.15 -0.16**  -0.16 -0.18** 
S.e. 0.10  0.08   0.10  0.08  
Mean (SRI) 0.71  0.71   0.71  0.71  
Panel C:  After-fee performance  
Net Alpha,  1 factor  
Coeff. 2.05** 0.98   2.08** 0.85  
S.e. 0.90  0.72   0.90  0.72  
Mean (SRI) 0.46  0.46   0.46  0.46  
      
Net Alpha,  4 factors  
Coeff. 1.80*** 1.05*  1.85*** 0.99* 
S.e. 0.67  0.58   0.67  0.57  
Mean (SRI) -0.76 -0.76  -0.76 -0.76 
*** 1% sig.; ** 5% sig.; * 10% sig.      
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 Table 5: Matching estimator analysis for fees.  
The table shows the matching estimator results (coefficient, standard error, and mean of the outcome 
variable for the SRI group) for differences between SRI and matched conventional funds. A positive sign 
indicates that the value of the outcome variable is higher for SRI funds. Matching variables include year, 
investment objective, fund age and total net assets (both in logs), and management company total net 
assets (in logs). Fees are in basis points.  
 
 Simple  Bias Corrected 
 1 match 4 matches  1 match 4 matches 
Expenses -1.31 -1.98  -2.09 -3.57 
Coeff.      
S.e. 6.22  4.69   6.21  4.71  
Mean (SRI) 134.45 134.45   134.45 134.45  
      
Total Loads 16.96  -20.03  20.68  -17.87 
Coeff.      
S.e. 33.80  25.90   33.68  25.85  
Mean (SRI) 181.55 181.55   181.55 181.55  
      
Total Ownership  Cost  
Coeff. 1.11  -4.84  0.86  -6.12 
S.e. 9.86  7.25   9.85  7.26  
Mean (SRI) 160.38 160.38   160.38 160.38  
*** 1% sig.; ** 5% sig.; * 10% sig.    
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Table 6: Matching estimator analysis by subperiods.  
The table shows the matching estimator results (coefficient, standard error, and mean of the outcome 
variable for the SRI group) for differences between SRI and matched conventional funds in: before-
expense performance, after-expense performance, and total ownership cost. A positive sign indicates that 
the value of the outcome variable is higher for SRI funds. Matching variables include year, investment 
objective, fund age and total net assets (both in logs), and management company total net assets (in logs). 
4-factor alphas are annual Carhart's alphas, respectively, and are reported as percentages. Total ownership 
cost is in basis points.  
 
Simple   Bias Corrected 
 1 match 4 matches  1 match 4 matches 
Panel A:  1997-2001      
Gross Alpha,  4 factors      
Coeff. 1.45  1.13   1.49  1.08  
S.e. 1.33  1.05   1.33  1.05  
Mean (SRI) 1.96  1.96   1.96  1.96  
      
Net Alpha,  4 factors      
Coeff. 1.37  1.08   1.42  1.04  
S.e. 1.32  1.05   1.32  1.05  
Mean (SRI) 0.59  0.59   0.59  0.59  
      
Total Ownership  Cost      
Coeff. 8.40  4.40   8.48  3.46  
S.e. 10.57  7.95   10.59  7.95  
Mean (SRI) 161.59 161.59   161.59 161.59  
Panel B:  2002-2005      
Gross Alpha,  4 factors      
Coeff. 0.81  0.26   0.78  0.24  
S.e. 0.62  0.51   0.62  0.51  
Mean (SRI) -1.00 -1.00  -1.00 -1.00 
      
Net Alpha,  4 factors      
Coeff. 0.82  0.25   0.79  0.23  
S.e. 0.61  0.51   0.62  0.51  
Mean (SRI) -2.40 -2.40  -2.40 -2.40 
      
Total Ownership  Cost      
Coeff. 4.50  1.14   4.39  1.19  
S.e. 9.80  7.50   9.80  7.54  
Mean (SRI) 169.87 169.87   169.87 169.87  
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Table 7: Matching Estimator Analysis. Funds with intensive social screening and funds with 
moderate social screening 
The table shows the matching estimator results (coefficient, standard error, and mean of the outcome 
variable for the SRI group) for differences between SRI and matched conventional funds. In Panel A only 
SRI funds with 10 or 11 screens are considered. In Panel B only SRI funds with less than 10 screens are 
considered. There are 15 funds with 10 or 11 screens and 15 funds with less than 10 screens in the sample. 
A positive sign indicates that the value of the outcome variable is higher for SRI funds. Matching 
variables include year, investment objective, fund age and total net assets (both in logs), and management 
company total net assets (in logs). Fees are in basis points.  
 
Simple  Bias Corrected 
 1 match 4 matches  1 match 4 matches 
Panel A: SRI funds with intensive screening versus matched conventional 
funds 
Gross Alpha, 4 factors  
Coefficient 4.27*** 2.01  5.00*** 1.82  
S.e. 1.48  1.91  1.73  1.94  
Mean (SRI) 1.22  1.22  1.22  1.22  
     
Net Alpha,  4 factors  
Coefficient 4.09*** 1.91  4.85*** 1.74  
S.e. 1.47  1.90  1.72  1.94  
Mean (SRI) -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 
     
Total Ownership  Cost  
Coefficient 27.47  15.41  21.3  11.99  
S.e. 20.97  15.85  20.67  15.80  
Mean (SRI) 174.84  174.84  174.84  174.84  
 
Panel B: SRI funds with moderate screening versus matched conventional 
funds 
Gross Alpha, 4 factors  
Coefficient 1.90  1.35  1.85  1.29  
S.e. 1.24  1.28  1.23  1.28  
Mean (SRI) 1.18  1.18  1.18  1.18  
  
Net Alpha,  4 factors  
Coefficient 1.86  1.28  1.78  1.22  
S.e. 1.26  1.30  1.24  1.30  
Mean (SRI) -0.36 -0.36 -0.36 -0.36 
  
Total Ownership  Cost  
Coefficient -0.17 -8.46 3.33  -8.77 
S.e. 23.42  18.06  23.87  18.05  
Mean (SRI) 166.62  166.62  166.62  166.62  
*** 1% sig.; ** 5% sig.; * 10% sig.  
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Table 8: Matching estimator analysis. Funds with in-house social screening and funds with some 
external social screening 
The table shows the matching estimator results (coefficient, standard error, and mean of the outcome variable for the 
SRI group) for differences between SRI and matched conventional funds. In Panel A we consider only SRI funds with 
in-house screening.  In Panel B we consider only SRI funds that perform at least part of the social screening outside 
of the management company that manages the fund's portfolio.  There are 17 funds that perform in-house screening 
only and 11 funds that perform some social screening outside of the fund's management company. A positive sign 
indicates that the value of the outcome variable is higher for SRI funds. Matching variables include year, investment 
objective, fund age and total net assets (both in logs), and management company total net assets (in logs). Fees are in 
basis points.  
 
Simple  Bias Corrected 
 1 match 4 matches  1 match 4 matches 
Panel A: SRI funds with in-house screening versus matched conventional funds 
Gross Alpha, 4 factors      
Coefficient 4.24*** 1.98   4.35*** 2.09  
S.e. 1.59  1.91   1.66  1.90  
Mean (SRI) 1.41  1.42   1.43  1.44  
      
Net Alpha,  4 factors      
Coefficient 4.07*** 1.86   4.21*** 2.00  
S.e. 1.58  1.90   1.65  1.89  
Mean (SRI) -0.12 -0.13  -0.14 -0.15 
      
Total Ownership  Cost      
Coefficient 13.98  8.38   11.94  3.65  
S.e. 19.34  13.55   19.40  13.63  
Mean (SRI) 174.60 174.61   174.62  174.63  
  
Panel B: SRI funds with some outside screening versus matched conventional funds 
Gross Alpha, 4 factors   
Coefficient 2.24*** 2.23***  2.08*** 2.23*** 
S.e. 0.69  0.83   0.67  0.84  
Mean (SRI) 1.55  1.56   1.57  1.58  
      
Net Alpha,  4 factors      
Coefficient 2.22*** 2.17**  2.02*** 2.18** 
S.e. 0.80  0.91   0.78  0.92  
Mean (SRI) 0.08  0.09   0.10  0.11  
      
Total Ownership  Cost      
Coefficient 17.48  3.73   21.47  2.68  
S.e. 31.29  24.19   30.85  24.22  
Mean (SRI) 172.90 172.91   172.92  172.93  
*** 1% sig.; ** 5% sig.; * 10% sig.     
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Table 9: Matching estimator analysis for SRI funds managed by the same management 
company. 
The table shows the matching estimator results (coefficient, standard error, and mean of the outcome variable for the 
SRI group) for differences between SRI funds and matched conventional funds managed by the same management 
company.  A positive sign indicates that the value of the outcome variable is higher for SRI funds. Matching variables 
include year, fund age and total net assets (both in logs). Fees are in basis points. 4-factor alphas are annual Carhart's 
alphas reported as percentages.  
 
 Simple  Bias Corrected  
 1 match 2 matches  1 match 2 matches 
Gross Alpha,  4 factors      
Coeff. 0.69  0.53   1.38  0.54  
S.e. 1.23  1.15   1.21  1.09  
Mean (SRI) -0.83 -0.94  -0.83 -0.94 
      
Net Alpha,  4 factors      
Coeff. 0.90  0.69   1.68  0.73  
S.e. 1.22  1.15   1.20  1.09  
Mean (SRI) -1.94 -2.02  -1.94 -2.02 
      
Total Ownership  Cost  
Coeff. -25.81** -22.45**  -40.28*** -22.66** 
S.e. 10.94  11.37   12.30  11.39  
Mean (SRI) 136.77  135.79   136.77  135.79  
* 10% sig.; ** 5% sig.; *** 1% sig.     
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Table 10: Matching estimator analysis for SRI funds managed by generalist and specialized management companies. 
The table shows the matching estimator results (coefficient, standard error, and mean of the outcome variable for the SRI group) for differences 
between: SRI funds managed by generalist management companies and matched conventional funds managed by generalist companies (Panel A); 
SRI funds managed by generalist management companies and matched conventional funds managed by all management companies (Panel B); and 
SRI funds managed by management companies specialized in SRI and matched conventional funds managed by all management companies (Panel 
C). Specialized (generalist) management companies offer SRI funds and have more (less) than 50% of their assets in this type of funds. A positive 
sign indicates that the value of the outcome variable is higher for SRI funds. Matching variables include year, investment objective, fund age and 
total net assets (both in logs), and management company total net assets (in logs). Fees are in basis points. 4-factor alphas are annual Carhart's alphas 
reported as percentages. 
 1 match (simple) 1 match (bias corrected) 
Panel A: SRI funds run by generalist management companies versus matched conventional funds run by generalist management 
companies 
Gross Alpha, 4 factors 
Coefficient -3.09 -4.23* 
S.e. 2.39 2.33 
Mean (SRI) -1.2 -1.2 
   
Net Alpha,  4 factors   
Coefficient -3.15 -4.24* 
S.e. 2.41  2.35  
Mean (SRI) -2.33 -2.33 
   
Total Ownership  Cost   
Coefficient 5.62  3.47  
S.e. 18.59  18.36  
Mean (SRI) 144.05  144.05  
Panel B: SRI funds run by generalist management companies versus matched conventional funds run by all management companies 
Gross Alpha, 4 factors   
Coefficient -1.41** -1.55** 
S.e. 0.66 0.64 
Mean (SRI) -1.2 -1.2 
   
Net Alpha,  4 factors   
Coefficient -1.16* -1.30* 
S.e. 0.69 0.67 
Mean (SRI) -2.33 -2.33 
   
Total Ownership  Cost   
Coefficient -23.48 -22.60 
S.e. 26.64  26.44  
Mean (SRI) 144.05  144.05  
Panel C: SRI funds run by specialized management companies versus matched conventional funds run by all management companies 
Gross Alpha, 4 factors   
Coefficient 2.76*** 2.74*** 
S.e. 0.81 0.82 
Mean (SRI) 1.12  1.12  
   
Net Alpha,  4 factors   
Coefficient 2.70*** 2.68*** 
S.e. 0.81  0.83  
Mean (SRI) -0.30 -0.30 
   
Total Ownership  Cost   
Coefficient 8.56  9.08  
S.e. 9.79  9.77  
Mean (SRI) 165.33  165.33  
* 10% sig.; ** 5% sig.; *** 1% sig. 
